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REEXAMINING THE GENDER IMPLICATIONS OF
CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM: How HIGHER CEILINGS ON
INDIVIDUAL DONATIONS DISPROPORTIONATELY IMPACT
FEMALE CANDIDATES
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By Ashley Baker*

he Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act ("BCRA"), signed
by the President and enacted into law on March 27,
..-.. 2002, capped a seven-year effort by its Congressional
sponsors to change federal campaign law and marked the most
significant amendment to the Federal Election Campaign Act
("FECA") in more than a quarter-century. BCRA's two pillars
are its prohibition on the raising and spending of "soft money"
by federal officeholders and candidates and its redefinition of
what constitutes a campaign advertisement. Proponents of
BCRA lauded its potential to address the corruptive effects of
money in politics while opponents of BCRA decried its impact
on the First Amendment rights of candidates and their contributors.
Reform legislation focused solely on corruption ignores the
reality that exploding campaign costs and obstacles to effective
fundraising by female candidates create severe barriers to political participation. While corruption is a valid
concern, the effects of campaign finance legislation are no less insidious.
One need only glance at the composition of the 109th U.S. Senate to find
them: one African American, two Pacific Islanders, three Latinos, 14
women and 80 White American men. 1
Consequently, assuming a priori that
the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the fundraising ability of candidates,2 this
Article seeks to develop an equal protection analysis of campaign finance reform by considering the effects of BCRA on
minority, particularly female, candidates for the Senate.
The first part of this article develops the theoretical underpinnings of the argument that campaign finance law impairs the
equal protection rights of female candidates. I briefly consider
the historical application of equal protection law in the arena of
elections and political campaigns and then situate campaign
finance within that jurisprudence. Second, this essay offers empirical evidence demonstrating both the gendered component to
candidate fundraising in U.S. Senate elections and the extent to
which campaign finance laws, exemplified by § 307 of BCRA
which increased individual contribution limits from $1,000 to
$2,000, 3 affect the relative ability of men and women to fundraise and campaign successfully. Third, I combine this data
with the theoretical arguments of the first section to articulate
my central argument - campaign finance regulations, as exemr

18

plified by § 307, operate in conjunction with gender disparities
in a fundraising capacity to impair the relative ability of women
to run for office. Fianlly, this article considers the legislative
application of this argument.

The Supreme Court has affirmed both the right to equal
participation of all voters and the right to a results-oriented determination of whether this right has been infringed. 4 In recent
decades, campaign finance has emerged as the new battleground
in the struggle for equality in the political arena. Most discussions of campaign finance discrimination have focused on the
individual level of the citizen voter or contributor. 5 However,
the campaign finance system is also suspect from the candidates' perspective to the extent that it impairs a candidate's ability to run, successfully, for office.
The Court has consistently afforded
protection of the absolute right of candidates to pursue elective office. Support for this right generally derives
from the First Amendment and judicial recognition that running for office
is a political activity vital to political
advocacy and expression. However,
courts have also recognized that restrictions on political participation
implicate a candidate's rights under
the Fourteenth Amendment. 6
In particular, the Court has consistently recognized and expressed hostility to economic discrimination against political
candidates. In Bullock v. Carter, the Supreme Court invalidated,
on equal protection grounds, a primary election filing fee that
required candidates to pay upwards of $6,000 to gain access to
the ballot. 7 The Court held that economic discrimination is an
unconstitutional barrier to political participation because it
"substantially limits" the voter's choice of candidates. 8 Similarly, in Lubin v. Panish, the Court held that California could not
deprive an indigent citizen the right to run for office because of
his inability to pay a filing fee. 9 Therefore, both Bullock and
Lubin illustrate the theoretical underpinnings of an argument
that declares financial barriers unconstitutional in the political
system which effectively can exclude candidates from running
for office.
Although under-funded candidates are not legally excluded
from participation, the centrality of money to modern campaigns
THE MODERN AMERICAN

excludes them in practice. In the wake of Buckley, the costs of
running for office at all political levels have exponentially increased. Total receipts in Congressional campaigns rose from
$194.8 million in 1978 to $1.185 billion in 2004. 1° Candidates
seeking office, particularly in statewide campaigns, require vast
sums of money to purchase television and radio advertising,
support door-to-door canvassing efforts, and otherwise connect
with the voting public. Campaign fundraising is highly correlated with electoral success, and it is in general, universally
accepted that candidate expenditures affect electoral outcomes. 11
Candidates who win, raise and spend more money than candidates who lose. In 2000, for example, the average Senate candidate spent $2.345 million while the average winning Senate candidate spent $7.589 million. 12 Although the relationship between spending and electoral success is not perfectly linear, the
correlation is striking.
To the extent that insufficient fundraising constructively
impairs the ability of candidates from a protected group to compete for elected office, campaign finance laws may present an
equal protection dimension. Yet, at first glance, the immense
centrality of money to electoral victory seems unaffected by
BCRA. In 2000 Senate candidates spent a total of $437 million13 and in 2004 they spent $488 million. 14 However, to identify the equal protection impact of campaign finance reform, one
must look beyond campaign finance totals to a gendered
analysis.
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Female candidates for the U.S. Senate crystallize both the
different fundraising capacities of candidates and the electoral
consequences of this fundraising dynamic. Even though women
have been historically underrepresented as both Senators and
candidates, their numbers in recent
years are sufficient for statistical
analysis. To the extent that the following data reveals the disproportionate impact of BCRA on women, existing campaign finance law also impairs
the constitutional, political rights of
female candidates.
Campaign fundraising posed a
significant obstacle to female candidates after the 1970s, when women
first began running for Congress in
significant numbers. 15 However, subsequent election cycles show a trend
of steady improvement in the ability
of female candidates to fundraise successfully. A turning point
in the electoral experience of female candidates culminated in
the 1992 election with a breakthrough in their ability to receive
financial campaign contributions. In 1992, women contested 11
races for Senate seats and emerged victorious in five, tripling
their representation in the Senate. During these campaigns,
Fall 2006

women raised record sums of money, even topping their male
opponents in the second quarter. 16 Female candidates raised
more money than men with similar backgrounds and 60% of
their contributions came from small, direct-mail donations from
women. 17 Many of the patterns of campaigning and fundraising
developed then, in 1992, carried into the next decade.
Carole Jean Uhlaner and Kay Lehman Schlozman's 1986
study, Candidate Gender and Congressional Campaign Receipts, is one of the few systematic efforts to analyze competing
theories of why women are perceived to be at a disadvantage in
fundraising when compared to their male counterparts. 18 Uhlaner and Schlozman examined whether gender had an independent effect on campaign finance. In conducting their analysis, they factored in gender with other variables, such as incumbency status, contested election, party, opponents' receipts, prior
experience, and vote-share in the previous election. 19 They concluded the relationship between gender and campaign finance
was not statistically significant; rather, the most relevant predictor of a candidate's receipts was their status as challengers. 20
Since this 1986 study, data and literature by other authors have
supported Uhlaner and Schlozman's theory. 21 Factors other than
gender are offered such as support from political action committees ("PACs"), to account for the disparity in fundraising. 22
However, as discussed later, this analysis shows that these
authors have incorrectly concluded that gender has no significant effect on campaign finance. When fundraising is disaggregated to consider the sources and amounts given to women, a
clear difference emerges in the capacity of women to raise
money from PACs and to collect large individual contributions.
Similarly, when women are further differentiated into successful
and unsuccessful candidates, women who win have demonstrably more money than either other female candidates or their
victorious male counterparts.
Before I tum to my findings, a brief word is needed on
my methodology and the limits it presents for this study. The study concerns the elections of 1998, 2000,
2002, and 2004. Data was collected
from the Federal Election Commission
and The Center for Responsive Politics23 and analyzes receipts collected
by all major party candidates during
this six-year finance period. Each
candidate's spending has been broken
down into individual contributions and
non-party contributions. These categories have been calculated as a percent of the candidate's total receipts in
an effort to control for spending disparities between different
states. Therefore, the variable considered throughout this paper
is the percent of total money received from the source in question. Each percentage is then further considered with respect to
gender within the various categories of party, result, and candidate status. To control for lopsided races and the propensity of
19

women to run as sacrificial candidates in such races, the analysis
discounts all candidates who failed to gamer 35% of the final
vote.
Analysis of the four election cycles raises several baseline
claims about the fundraising conducted by female candidates for
the U.S. Senate. As a whole, these propositions remain true
whether such fundraising was conducted under FECA or BCRA.

Individual contributions overwhelmingly comprise the most
important source of financing for all candidates. 24 In elections
conducted under FECA (1998, 2000, and 2002), women collected 71.34% of their contributions from individual donors and
16.51 % from PACs. In 2004, under BCRA limits, women collected 73.13% from individual donations and 20.38% from
PA Cs. In contrast, men collected 61.32% of their contributions
in 1998, 2000, and 2002 from individual donors; 68. 72% of their
total funds came from individual donors in 2004. 25
This proposition holds true in all categories of analysis party, candidate status, and race outcome - and is particularly significant
in open-seat and challenger races
where female candidates are historiTlte r!ifl~~,r~~'J'fc·e
-cally most likely to be concentrated.
Compared to men, the average female
candidate in these four election cycles
raised 7.22% more of their financing
from individual donors. Incumbent
female candidates raised just 5% more
of their finances from individual donors than incumbent males while
women running as challengers and for
open seats raised over 12% more of their finances from individual contributors than their male counterparts raised.

Women and men raise individual contributions in different
amounts and from different sources. The vast majority of large
donors to political campaigns are men. 26 Female candidates as a
whole depend particularly upon female donors for financial viability and win monetary support from men only as their odds of
election increase near to certainty. 27 Moreover, the average size
of individual donations to most female candidates continues to
be smaller than the average donation to male candidates. For
example, female non-incumbents received 1/4 of all individual
contributions in amounts less than $200 whereas men received
about 1/5 of their contributions in these smaller denominations.28 There are several possible explanations for this discrepancy, ranging from a purported psychological barrier, rooted in
historic sex-role patterns, against women asking for large sums
20

of money; to direct discrimination against female candidates; to
continuing underrepresentation in the professional and social
networks that serve as major sources of campaign contributions.29 Ultimately, however, the relevant point is that female
candidates' tendencies both to depend more heavily than male
candidates on individual contributions and to receive smaller
contributions ensure that female candidates must attract far
greater numbers of individual contributors than their male counterparts just to equalize the total monetary value of their contributions.

Equalization of contribution totals may not even be sufficient to equalize the electoral outcomes or opportunities of male
and female candidates. Analysis of aggregate levels of fundraising demonstrates noticeable differences in the finances necessary for female candidates to run successful campaigns. These
differences exist in the amount of money necessary to reach the
35% threshold of campaign viability considered in this essay
and the amount of money necessary to win a Senate seat. Considering all four electoral cycles,
women reaching this 35% mark, on
average, collected about $7.6 million
or $5 million more than male cani,;J~~,~~'rt
didates.
Additionally, while women who
win raise significantly more money
than women who lose, male winners
collect only marginally more money
than their loosing counterparts. The
difference between male winners and
losers is only about $300,000. In contrast, female winners and losers are
separated by $5 .1 million, a particularly striking discrepancy
considering that candidates failing to collect at least 35% of the
final vote have already been excluded from this analysis. Thus,
for women, $5 million is the price of the mere 15%-point difference between winning and losing.

By simply increasing the individual contribution limit from
$1,000 to $2,000, §307 of BCRA, in effect, exacerbated the female candidates' disadvantage in each of the three aforementioned facets of gender-specific fundraising. Simultaneously,
BCRA enhanced the fundraising capacities of male candidates
who have always had a greater ability to collect the maximum
contribution. Therefore, male candidates' greater ability to collect maximum contributions doubled in magnitude under
BCRA.
Since the enactment of §307, both male and female candidate individual contributions (understood as a percentage of
their total funding) have increased, but individual contributions
to male candidates has increased significantly more. In 2004,
THE MODERN AMERICAN

while female candidates experienced less than a percentagepoint increase in individual contributions, male candidates received an eight point jump. 30 Male incumbents and candidates
who won their races experienced a particularly significant jump
in individual contributions, with male incumbents gaining nearly
5% in individual contributions and winning male candidates
gaining nearly 8%. Meanwhile, female candidates in corresponding
categories either experienced no
change or actual decline in their relative individual contributions. 31 Effectively, the bump from $1,000 to
$2,000 has boosted the individual contributions of candidates most capable
of receiving maximum contributions such as incumbents, probable winners
and male candidates in general.
Ultimately, BCRA favored male
candidates by increasing their individual, and overall, contributions and failing to affect a corollary
benefit on the fundraising of female candidates. Prior to the
enactment of BCRA, female candidates averaged $7.33 million
in total receipts to male candidates' $6.34 million. After BCRA,
female and male candidates averaged $7.97 million and $7.93
million, respectively. This phenomenon affected women regardless of candidate status. Incumbent female candidates, who had
previously enjoyed a $3.4 million advantage over male candidates, saw their edge drop by $2 million in 2004. 32 Female challengers were affected even more severely as their total receipts
declined by more than 1/3, from just over $3 million pre-BCRA
to $1.9 million in 2004. 33 In contrast, male challengers increased their receipts from $5.5 million to $6.2 million, thereby
raising, on average, over 200% more money than female challengers. 34 On the whole, because women start out severely underrepresented and have a high propensity to run as challengers,
the prospect that female challengers cannot fundraise as effectively as male candidates cast grave implications towards the
representation of women in the Senate.
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Unquestionably, BCRA is a facially neutral law. Moreover,
this analysis reveals that BCRA established financial parity between candidates of different genders insofar as women had
enjoyed, in the aggregate, a fundraising advantage over men
prior to BCRA's enactment. However, with respect to the legal
rights affected by BCRA, the relevant consideration is the degree of effective political participation, enjoyed through the act
of running for office that candidates of different genders were
able to exercise by virtue of money raised. Money engenders
successful candidacy; particularly at the Senate level, fundraising is crucial to launching a legitimate and successful campaign.35 Female candidates, as demonstrated above, require
more money than men to reach the thresholds of both campaign
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viability and electoral success. Thus, the decline in the female
candidates' fundraising advantage should be interpreted as a
decline in their ability to participate in the electoral process.
It must be noted that in neither the pre- nor the postBCRA periods did female candidates achieve comparable success rates to male candidates. Taking the number of female
winners as a percent of the total number of successful candidates, women
were successful in the past four election cycles 13.6% of the time on average.36 In 2004, the proportion of successful female candidates did not significantly differ from the three prior
cycles; however, this fact is likely due
primarily to the high number of incumbent women running and winning
in 2004 and should not be taken as
evidence that BCRA did not affect the
success rates of female candidates. In
fact, the absence of success by open-seat and challenger candidates in 2004 is strikingly below the historical success rate for
such candidates, which is about 45% and 5% respectively. 37
Courts have considered equal-protection challenges to campaign finance laws premised on the discriminatory effects of
campaign finance regulations on political challengers. While
previous claims are not completely analogous to those of female
candidates, they are instructive in articulating a theory of harm
and in understanding the courts' receptiveness to the gendered
claims raised in this article. The case study presented in this
article is strengthened to the extent that women are an identifiable class to whom the Court has consistently afforded protection under the equal protection clause.
In addition to their First Amendment challenges, the Buckley appellants argued that contribution limitations resulted in
invidious discrimination between incumbents and challengers
because challengers needed large sums of money to overcome
the disadvantages of lesser name recognition. 38 The Court rejected this claim largely on grounds that there was insufficient
evidence to support it, but, significantly, it did not reject the
theory itself.3 9 The Court held that, because there was no evidence that incumbents would benefit more, and because the danger of corruption is equal among challengers and incumbents,
Congress had justifiably put fundraising constraints on both
classes. Still, the Court explained that, even though the law appeared evenhanded on its face, "[t]he appearance of fairness ...
may not reflect political reality." 40
Likewise, the plaintiffs in McConnell v. Federal Election
Commission made a similar claim that contribution limits discriminated against challengers. The Court dismissed the plaintiffs claim for lack of standing, specifically, for the plaintiffs
inability to show that the alleged injury was fairly traceable to
§ 307 of BCRA. 41 However, the Court remained divided on the
viability of the theory itself. As Justice Scalia's biting dissent
stated, "[T]o be sure, the legislation is evenhanded .... [b ]ut as
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everyone knows, this is an area in which evenhandedness is not
fairness. If all electioneering were evenhandedly prohibited,
incumbents would have an enormous advantage." 42
Two federal district court cases further develop this theory.
In Minnesota Citizens Concerned for Life v. Kelley, a pro-life
candidate alleged that a year-based limit on contributions discriminated against challengers because they generally entered a
race late in an election cycle whereas incumbents were able to
raise money throughout their terms. 43 The court concluded here
that it had no basis on which to find that the year-based limit
discriminated against challengers as a class; thus, the plaintiff
had failed to carry his burden. 44
Additionally, Driver v. Distefano considered a challenge to
a Rhode Island statute limiting political contributions to $1,000,
which the plaintiff argued violated the Fourteenth Amendment
by impermissibly discriminating against challengers in favor of
incumbents. 45 In expressing at least a theoretical receptiveness
to the argument, the court went so far as to posit a two-part test
for its analysis: first, the court must determine whether the statute employs evenhanded language and is therefore evenhanded
on its face; then, if it is facially evenhanded, the court must determine
whether a discriminatory effect exists
in practice. 46 Ultimately, the court's
decision rests on a rejection of the
second part of this test in which the
court did not believe that the statute in
fact discriminated against challengers.
The court noted that the available evidence contradicted the plaintiffs
claim that challengers could catch up
with incumbents by raising more
money from contributions in excess of
$1,000 than incumbents could. 47 Therefore, as in Mississippi,
Buckley, and McConnell, the court here accepted the legal theory but found that the plaintiff presented insufficient evidence to
carry his burden of proving discriminatory effect.
Empirical support for the proposition that BCRA limits disadvantaged female candidates corrects the shortcomings of these
prior attempts to strike down contribution limits on equal protection grounds. Additionally, this claim corrects a further weakness in prior formulations - the availability of political participation is inequitable in regards to poorly funded candidates in general, and to female candidates in particular. Although it remains
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doubtful that the Court will recognize a fundamental right to
wage equally effective campaigns for elective office, 48 the Court
is inherently more receptive to claims of discrimination levied
by women by virtue of their nature as a suspect class.
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Given the Court's baseline recognition of a candidate's fundamental right to participate in the political process, the empirical showing that immutable characteristics, consistently recognized as mandating particular scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, correlate with disproportionate fundraising disadvantages highlight the extent to which current campaign finance
laws violate that right. 49
The remedies for this particular campaign finance dilemma are different from many of the legislative proposals advocated by campaign finance reformers because many of those
remedies focus on corruption and free-speech debates. Recognizing that a finance scheme that facially awards female candidates more money than male candidates would be politically and
constitutionally untenable, I propose
that the best remedy would be a cap on
political contributions at the amount
that all candidates are equally capable
of collecting. Neither the current level
nor the pre-BCRA limit is acceptable
in terms of ensuring equal political
participation. While further research
is needed to determine this limit in
precise dollars, drastically reducing
the maximum contribution would simultaneously equalize the fundraising
capacity of all candidates and cause
aggregate campaign receipts to correlate much more closely
with the extent of each candidate's base support.
This statistical showing of the discriminatory effects of current campaign finance structures exposes the need to expand the
campaign finance debate to include assurances that regulations,
like other laws governing electoral participation, operate consistently with the equal protection requirements of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments and recognize the rights of candidates
to enjoy equal opportunity to participate in the political process.
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from Yale University in 2004.
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